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The Success of Others: Copy Trading and Risk
Carolin Stein, Philipp Staudt, and Anke Greif-Winzrieth
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany
{carolin.stein9, philipp.staudt, anke.greif-winzrieth}@kit.edu

Abstract. Social trading platforms and day trading apps are increasingly popular.
They allow copy trading which means that trades of another trader are automatically copied. Traders can provide credentials, which has been shown to make
them seem trustworthy. These features have been shown to increase the tendency
of inexperienced users to take risks. We present the design and preliminary results
of an experimental study that investigates whether the negative externalities of
social trading can be alleviated if the corresponding trades have to be executed
actively. In the experiment, the users observe the trading behavior and success of
anonymous other users and are then asked to take investment decisions without
being able to automatically trade as the observed investors. Pretest results indicate
that having to execute the investment decisions themselves might reduce the tendency to take risky decisions. This is a promising avenue for the regulation of day
trading apps.
Keywords: Social trading platforms, Risk perception, Behavioral experiment
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Introduction

Social trading platforms and day trading apps have increasingly attracted inexperienced
retail traders [1]. During the Covid19 pandemic the popular trading app Robinhood
reported three million new accounts opened in the first quarter of 2020 alone and a tripling
of its trading volume throughout the year [2]. Researchers have already reported that
the trading behavior using such apps leads to riskier, more lottery-type investments [3].
These apps often include social trading features. For instance, the app eToro allows
retail investors to replicate the trading behavior of registered users. This is called copy
trading and the authors of [4] find that it increases the users’ tendency to take risks. It
has furthermore been shown in this context that traders make riskier trades when they
receive more attention from the community in an effort to boost their ratings which
might then be copied by novice investors. This leads to diminishing performance [5]
and possibly to large losses of non-expert users. Therefore, government regulation is
necessary to reduce this financial threat to inexperienced traders. However, the related
risk behavior of non-expert users observing the active traders is not fully understood. For
instance, in [6] the authors report ambiguous results regarding risk behavior on social
trading platforms and show that credentials of traders provided to other users mainly
influence whether these traders are copied. At the same time, the experiment in [4]
indicates that observing traders in a ranking and being able to copy their behavior leads
to a higher risk tendency. In this paper, we present the design and preliminary results
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of an experimental study that evaluates whether observing the success of active traders
leads to increasingly risky behavior if (i) there are not credentials of the copied traders
available and (ii) the trades cannot simply be copied but the decision to invest has to be
actively taken. This information can help financial regulators to design policy to reduce
negative externalities of the increasing usage of day trading apps. We present results of
the pretest with 48 participants, which indicate that observing the success of others does
not increase the risk tendency in this setting. This is promising for the full experiment
and holds important information for public financial regulators of day trading apps and
social trading platforms.
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Theoretical Background

Theory suggests that humans replicate behavior they observe [7] and that the outcome
bias [8] causes them to judge behavior not by its actual risk but by its outcome. Furthermore, in [9] the authors find that winning a lottery leads to decreasing risk aversion. In
the context of day trading apps and social trading platforms the authors of [4] show that
users might underestimate the risk of successful stocks or traders they observe. However,
the authors of [6] find that personal credentials might have a stronger effect on the the
users’ tendency to take risks copying other traders than observed success. Furthermore,
the copy feature as provided in [4] might lead to riskier decisions due to the lower
cognitive load of this option. In their review, the authors of [10] report that risk aversion
is increased if cognitive load increases. This leads to the question whether specific app
features allowing to observe trader credentials and to copy trades without active investment cause the increased risk tendency of inexperienced users. Therefore, we theorize in
this study that only allowing to actively copy the observed successful trades of others
without providing additional credentials on active traders does not increase the tendency
to take risky decisions. We aim to contribute to the theoretical understanding of human
behavior on day trading apps and social trading platforms. More precisely, we theorize
that eliminating the described features in day trading apps and on social trading platforms
reduces the danger of financial losses due to unforeseen risks for individual, inexperienced users. In order to test the following hypothesis, we design a behavioral experiment.
Hypothesis 1 Observing the success of active traders does not increase the tendency to
make risky investments if their credentials are not available and investment decisions
have to be actively taken.
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Experimental Design and Preliminary Results

To test the hypothesis, we propose an experimental design that compares active investment decisions of players having observed the success of anonymous active traders to
decisions of a control group that is exposed to anonymous traders without a winning
streak. The procedure is presented in Fig. 1. The experiment is implemented using
otree [11]. First, we assess the participants’ risk preferences. The first question asks
participants to choose between a lottery that pays 3.5 Euros (EUR) in case of success

with a probability of 80% and 0 otherwise and a lottery that pays 2 EUR with certainty.
In the second question, we ask participants to provide a probability p for which they
would prefer a lottery that pays 2 EUR with probability p and 0 otherwise over a lottery
that pays 1 EUR with certainty. To ensure truthful answers, we tell the participants that
their payout will be calculated based on the value p they provide. With probability p they
play lottery 1. The resulting payouts are only reported to the participants at the end of the
experiment to avoid any biases that might affect subsequent decisions. Participants are
then randomly assigned to one of four treatments with two dimensions namely (control
(C)/success(S)) and (observer (O)/player (P)) as shown in Table 1. The following game is
then divided into two phases which are shown as Parts 3 and 4 of the experiment in Fig. 1.
Phase 1: Players actively make three investment decisions under uncertainty (not
risk as no probabilities are displayed). They are shown stock developments in a chart
and can decide to sell, buy or pass. The decision whether they win or lose is based on a
random number generator and corresponding probabilities are unknown to the players.
If they are successful they receive an amount based on the played lottery but if they are
unsuccessful they lose an amount according to the lottery. If they pass, their account
balance does not change. The potential gains and losses change over the three decisions.
The possible outcomes in the lotteries are (2,-1), (1,-1) and (4,-4). We supplemented the
players with computer agents that play the game randomly. This increases the amount
of players that can be observed by the observers. Observers are passive during this first
phase of the game and only observe the results of the four other players’ choices. They
can see the alternatives the players are confronted with, their decisions and the outcomes.
However, the observers are unaware that we do not communicate probabilities for the
lotteries to the players and that these probabilities for the outcomes are also unknown
to the players. In other words, the observers are unaware of the risks the players are
taking and that the players are also unaware of these risks. The participants’ roles and
winning probabilities are shown in Table 1. However, to reiterate, the participants are all
unaware of these probabilities. The control group player that is observed by the success
observers is included to avoid the impression that everyone always wins. The lower
winning probabilities for the computer agents observed by the control group are intended
to reduce the probability of a winning streak thus confounding the effects of the control
and success observers.
Phase 2: In order to measure changes in the risk behavior, all players choose between
two different lotteries after treatment exposure. The lotteries are based on an image of a
stock price development to create an association with the previous tasks and trading apps.
The risky lottery pays 6 EUR with a probability of 55% and -7 EUR with a probability
of 45%. The less risky lottery pays 3 EUR with a probability of 56% and -3.5 EUR with
a probability of 44%. Payouts and probabilities are known to all participants and the
expected values of both lotteries are the same. The participants also have the option to
pass and thus not to play any of the lotteries which results in a payout of zero. Expected
payouts of both lotteries are greater than zero, so the rational choice is to play either
of the lotteries instead of passing. The participants are aware that their final payments
depend on their decisions. The experiment is therefore incentive-aligned: Participants

Table 1. Roles & Treatments
Participant
1-4
5-8
9-10
11-12
Computer player 1
Computer player 2-3

Treatment
Observer - Success
Observer - Control
Player - Success
Player - Control
Player - Success
Player - Control

Description
Observe players 9-11 & computer player 1
Observe players 11-12 & computer players 2-3
Winning probabilities of 99% or 100%
Winning probabilities of 50%
Winning probabilities of 99% or 100%
Winning probabilities of 40% or 30%

intend to maximize their payout which allows us to observe which risks they are willing
to take. The risky decision at the end has a strong impact on the final payout for the
observers who can otherwise only earn funds through the initial lotteries measuring their
risk aversion.

Figure 1. Experimental Procedure

The experimental design was pretested in a behavioral laboratory under controlled
conditions. Subjects were recruited from the participant pool maintained by the Karlsruhe Decision & Design Lab (KD2 Lab) using hroot [12]. The participants completed the
experiment in individual cabins and could not communicate with each other. The pretest
was conducted in two sessions on consecutive days with a total of 48 participants. Of
the 48 participants, 14 were women and 34 were men aged 18 to 42 with a mean of 24.1
years, 97.92% were university students and most came from Germany (72.91%). The
experiment was conducted in English and participants were asked to only register if they
have a very good proficiency in English. The average payout was 11.6 Euros. The experiment took about 45 minutes. We conducted a manipulation check by asking the observers
after the experiment about the observed success of their peers. Out of the observerssuccess group, 71.9% stated that their peers would always or often win, 28.1% said that
their peers would win sometimes. Out of the observers-control group only 21.9% stated
that their peers would always or often win, 65.6% said sometimes and 12.5% stated never.
The focus of this paper is the analysis of the risky decisions of the observers shown in
Figure 2 alongside the risky decisions of the players. Participants can only play the risky
decision in Phase 2 if their funds are sufficient to cover potential losses. This resulted
in only 87.5% of participants being able to take a decision at the end. In total, 67% of
those participants chose to gamble in the final round and to play one of the lotteries. 40%
played the more risky lottery and 27% the less risky lottery. Of the observers-control,
75% chose a lottery instead of passing, 44% chose the more risky alternative and 31% the
more conservative lottery. Out of the observers-success only 56% chose a lottery, 37%

chose the more risky alternative and 19% the conservative lottery as can be seen in Fig.
2. This is remarkable as participants acting as observers-control were more risk averse
before treatment exposure than those participants acting as observers-success. 31% of
the observers-control chose the certain payout in the initial lottery (the highest value of
all groups, compared to 13% in the observers-success group, which is the lowest value)
and their average p for accepting the lottery was 0.75, again the highest and therefore
most risk averse value of all groups. These observations show support for the initial
hypothesis that observing success does not necessarily lead to more risky behavior if
additional credentials are not available and the risky decision has to be actively taken.
The unexpected reduction in risk tendency suggests that additional factors might be at
play. This is the next step in the course of this study. As this research-in-progress only
reports the results of a smaller pilot study, we cannot establish statistical significance.
However, the preliminary results are noteworthy and deserve further attention.

Figure 2. Risky decision of participants
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Conclusion & Outlook

Day trading apps and social trading platforms are increasingly popular. However, it
has been shown that trades on these apps have gambling-like characteristics and that
these platforms and their features lead to risky investment decisions which might cause
unexpected financial harm to inexperienced traders. We present an experimental design
to evaluate whether specific features on day trading apps and social trading platforms
influence risky behavior. We report first results from a pretest. Opposed to previous
studies eliciting risk behavior on social trading platforms when trader credentials are
presented and copy trading is executed automatically, we find that observing success
might not lead to more risky behavior when these features are not present. A preliminary
explanation might be the inverse gamblers’ fallacy which describes the expectation of a
loss if lots of wins were observed [13] that cannot be otherwise explained. However, it is
important to note that we only looked at compound effects. In the full experiment, we
will employ additional treatments focusing on the features individually. The results of
this preliminary study are promising and hold important information for governmental
financial regulators who might want to limit the financial risk coming from day trading
apps and social trading platforms for non-expert users. Furthermore, other longitudinal
studies are important as the experiment only allows us to observe short-term effects.
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